"""Tests de sécurité : anti-forgery du cookie de session.

Avant le correctif, n'importe qui pouvait forger le cookie `user_id=admin` et
accéder aux données d'un autre utilisateur. La signature HMAC doit rendre toute
altération détectable.
"""
import sys

# DATA_DIR temporaire est positionné par conftest.py avant l'import de models.
import models  # noqa: F401

sys.path.insert(0, ".")
import main
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient

client = TestClient(main.app)


def _seed_user(uid: str):
    import bcrypt
    models.save_auth(uid, email=f"{uid}@x.fr",
                     password_hash=bcrypt.hashpw(b"x" * 12, bcrypt.gensalt()).decode())


def _login(uid: str) -> dict:
    _seed_user(uid)
    r = client.post("/login/password",
                    data={"email": f"{uid}@x.fr", "password": "x" * 12},
                    follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 302, r.text
    return {"user_id": r.cookies.get("user_id")}


# ── Forgery du cookie ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def test_unsigned_cookie_rejected():
    """Un cookie `user_id=admin` forgé à la main doit être rejeté."""
    _seed_user("alice")
    r = client.get("/semaine/2026/29", cookies={"user_id": "alice"}, follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 302
    assert "/login" in r.headers["location"]


def test_tampered_signature_rejected():
    """Un cookie valide dont on modifie la signature doit être rejeté."""
    cookies = _login("alice")
    raw = cookies["user_id"]
    user_id, _, sig = raw.rpartition(".")
    # Inverse un caractère de la signature
    bad_sig = ("0" if sig[0] != "0" else "1") + sig[1:]
    tampered = f"{user_id}.{bad_sig}"
    r = client.get("/semaine/2026/29", cookies={"user_id": tampered}, follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 302
    assert "/login" in r.headers["location"]


def test_valid_signed_cookie_accepted():
    """Le cookie signé délivré par /login/password doit ouvrir la session."""
    cookies = _login("alice")
    r = client.get("/semaine/2026/29", cookies=cookies, follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 200


def test_signed_cookie_cannot_be_replayed_for_other_user():
    """La signature d'alice ne doit pas valider pour bob (user_id modifié)."""
    cookies = _login("alice")
    raw = cookies["user_id"]
    _, _, sig = raw.rpartition(".")
    # Remplace alice par bob en conservant la signature d'alice
    forged = f"bob.{sig}"
    _seed_user("bob")
    r = client.get("/semaine/2026/29", cookies={"user_id": forged}, follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 302
    assert "/login" in r.headers["location"]


# ── Helpers de signature ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def test_sign_and_verify_roundtrip():
    sig = main._sign_user_id("alice")
    assert main._verify_signed_cookie(sig) == "alice"


def test_verify_rejects_malformed_inputs():
    for bad in ("", "alice", "alice.", ".", "alice.deadbeef", "inva/lid.xxx"):
        assert main._verify_signed_cookie(bad) is None


def test_secret_is_stable_across_calls():
    s1 = models.load_or_create_secret()
    s2 = models.load_or_create_secret()
    assert s1 == s2


# ── Validation SSRF du serveur ntfy ──────────────────────────────────────────

import notifications  # noqa: E402


def test_ntfy_server_validation_accepts_https():
    assert notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server("https://ntfy.sh")
    assert notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server("https://ntfy.example.com:8080")


def test_ntfy_server_validation_rejects_loopback():
    for bad in ("http://127.0.0.1:1", "http://127.0.0.1", "http://localhost",
                "https://localhost:8443", "https://[::1]"):
        assert not notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server(bad), bad


def test_ntfy_server_validation_rejects_private_networks():
    for bad in ("https://10.0.0.1", "https://172.16.5.5", "https://192.168.1.1",
                "https://169.254.169.254", "http://10.255.255.1:8080"):
        assert not notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server(bad), bad


def test_ntfy_server_validation_rejects_bad_schemes():
    for bad in ("ftp://ntfy.sh", "file:///etc/passwd", "gopher://x", "javascript:alert(1)"):
        assert not notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server(bad), bad


def test_ntfy_server_validation_rejects_credentials_in_url():
    assert not notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server("https://user:pass@ntfy.sh")


def test_ntfy_server_validation_rejects_empty_or_none():
    for bad in ("", None, "   "):
        assert not notifications.is_safe_ntfy_server(bad), bad


def test_send_ntfy_refuses_ssrf_target():
    """Un appel vers une IP privée ne doit jamais ouvrir de connexion réseau."""
    import urllib.request as u
    called = {"n": 0}
    orig = u.urlopen
    try:
        u.urlopen = lambda *a, **kw: called.__setitem__("n", called["n"] + 1)
        ok = notifications.send_ntfy(
            "http://169.254.169.254", "ssrf-topic",
            "msg", "titre", user_id=None, token="",
        )
    finally:
        u.urlopen = orig
    assert ok is False
    assert called["n"] == 0  # urlopen n'a jamais été appelé


def test_settings_save_rejects_ssrf_ntfy_server():
    """POST /settings avec un serveur SSRF doit être rejeté."""
    cookies = _login("carol")
    # Préserve un topic valide
    models.save_notif_config("carol", ntfy_topic="t", ntfy_server="https://ntfy.sh")
    r = client.post("/settings", cookies=cookies, data={
        "ntfy_topic": "topic-x",
        "ntfy_server": "http://169.254.169.254",
        "ntfy_token": "",
        "rappel_debut_h": "8",
        "rappel_fin_h": "19",
    }, follow_redirects=False)
    assert r.status_code == 303
    assert "ssrf_error=1" in r.headers["location"]
    # La valeur précédente est conservée
    cfg = models.load_notif_config("carol")
    assert cfg["ntfy_server"] == "https://ntfy.sh"